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I. INTRODUCTION
HE independent auditing profession serves an essential role in our
market economy by certifying that financial statements fairly pres-
ent a company's financial condition and results of operations. Fi-
nancial statements provide useful information to people making business
and economic decisions. Trade creditors, financial institutions, and inves-
tors rely on audited financial statements in determining whether to trans-
act with a given company. Accounting firms audit financial statements to
give these users some assurance that the statements do not contain mate-
rial errors.
Auditor liability arises when independent auditors fail to discover ma-
terial misstatements or fraud contained in financial statements that they
should have discovered if they had performed the audit according to the
auditing profession's standards. There are two key issues with respect to
auditor liability: (1) whether auditor liability should sound in tort or in
contract law, and (2) if tort doctrine applies, precisely what should be the
scope of liability to third parties. Jurisdictions differ significantly with re-
spect to these two issues. A significant number of jurisdictions have de-
termined that contract law should apply, while other jurisdictions have
applied a variety of different negligence standards. When courts apply
tort law, they use a variety of different legal concepts to artificially limit
auditor liability to third parties. These concepts highlight judges' lack of
understanding of the auditor's role in the economy and the purpose of an
audit report.
This Comment examines the incentives and restraints facing auditors
and investors and concludes that auditor liability to third-party users of
financial statements should sound in tort, rather than contract law. Fur-
thermore, the standard for auditor liability should be a professional negli-
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gence standard, and auditors should be liable for their negligence to any
investor who has been harmed by his reasonable reliance on the audit
report. While the Comment recognizes that audits provide only limited
surety against misstated financial statements, the purpose of an audit is to
ensure that management fairly presents financial information. Auditors
owe a duty to the users of financial statements to perform all tests re-
quired by the standards of the auditing profession to ensure that financial
statements are fairly presented.
Part II of this Comment will briefly examine the business purpose be-
hind audits and the unique public role of the auditing profession. Part III
examines the evolution of the common law of auditor liability by examin-
ing leading cases representing each of the three major third-party liability
standards. Part IV examines the various policy determinants that under-
lie the differing theories regarding the role of the auditor and suggests a
scope of liability that is most consistent with these policies.
II. BACKGROUND: THE AUDITING PROCESS AND THE
UNIQUE PUBLIC ROLE OF THE AUDITING PROFESSION
A. THE AUDITING PROCESS
Certified public accountants ("CPAs") perform audits, under contract
with their clients, to give an opinion on whether the client's financial
statements fairly present its financial position in conformity with Gener-
ally Accepted Accounting Principles ("GAAP"). Management produces
the financial statements and the underlying accounting records. There-
fore, the auditor must agree that management's choice of accounting
principles is appropriate and that any estimates are reasonable.
In order to conduct an audit, the auditor designs and performs a series
of tests and procedures to determine whether the financial statements
conform to GAAP. The auditor should perform these procedures in con-
formance with Generally Accepted Auditing Standards ("GAAS"),1
1. Generally Accepted Auditing Standards are divided into three groups: general
standards, standards of field work, and standards of reporting. See CODIFICATION OF
STATEMENTS ON AUDITING STANDARDS, AU § 150.02 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Ac-
countants 1999) [hereinafter AICPA Auditing Standards]. Lawsuits against auditors usu-
ally arise over alleged violations of either the general standards or the standards of field
work. These standards are as follows:
General Standards
1. The [examination] is to be performed by a person or persons having ade-
quate technical training and proficiency as an auditor.
2. In all matters relating to the assignment, an independence in mental atti-
tude is to be maintained by the auditor or auditors.
3. Due professional care is to be exercised in the performance of the [exami-
nation] and the preparation of the report.
Standards of Field Work
1. The work is to be adequately planned, and assistants, if any, are to be
properly supervised.
2. A sufficient understanding of internal control [structure] is to be obtained




which are ten broad standards promulgated by the Auditing Standards
Board of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
("AICPA"). These, along with the Statements on Auditing Standards
("SAS"), which were also promulgated by the Auditing Standards Board
to elaborate on the general standards, define the standard of care in the
auditing profession.2 Unlike GAAS, the SAS can be quite detailed.
GAAP determines the correct method or methods to account for a
given transaction. This is distinguished from GAAS, which involves the
accepted means to test that a given accounting transaction is in conform-
ance with GAAP. Because of the inherent judgmental nature of financial
reporting, in certain circumstances GAAP allows firms considerable dis-
cretion regarding the correct method to record certain types of transac-
tions in the financial statements. For this reason, there may be a dynamic
tension between management, which understandably wants to present the
financial statements by interpreting GAAP in a favorable light, and the
auditor, who may wish to take a more conservative approach.
One of the first goals of the audit is to ensure that the client under-
stands the purpose and limitations of an audit. Non-CPAs often believe
that an audit should amount to a guarantee that there is no accounting
fraud within the firm. In reality, this is not the case. A standard financial
statement audit is not designed to detect many types of fraud, particularly
systematic fraud involving the collusion of management. The AICPA
Codification of Statements on Auditing Standards explains:
A presumption of management dishonesty ... [would indicate that
the auditor would] ... potentially need to question the genuineness
of all records and documents obtained from the client and would
require conclusive rather than persuasive evidence to corroborate all
management representations. An audit conducted on these terms
would be unreasonably costly and impractical. 3
Audits seek persuasive, not conclusive, evidence that a client's financial
3. Sufficient competent evidential matter is to be obtained through inspec-
tion, observation, inquiries, and confirmations to afford a reasonable basis
for an opinion regarding the financial statements under [examination].
Id.
2. Under Rule 202 of the Code of Professional Conduct, every member of the
AICPA must comply with all applicable SAS. See PROFESSIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT, ET
202 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1999) [hereinafter Code of Professional Con-
duct]. Virtually all courts allow these standards to be introduced at trial as evidence of the
standard of care. See GEORGE SPELLMIRE ET AL., ACCOUNTING, AUDITING, AND FINAN-
CIAL MALPRACTICE § 3.05, at 43 (1998). Some courts have held that the standard of care
for accountants is defined by the principles set forth in GAAP, GAAS, and the SAS. See,
e.g., SEC v. Arthur Young, 590 F.2d 785, 788 (9th Cir. 1979); Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst,
503 F.2d 1100, 1108 (7th Cir. 1974); Hawaii Corp. v. Crossley, 567 F. Supp. 609, 617 (D.
Haw. 1983); Seafirst Corp. v. Jenkins, 644 F Supp. 1152, 1153-54 (W.D. Wash. 1986). Other
courts have held that AICPA standards are merely evidentiary and not controlling as to the
standard of care. See Mishkin v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 744 F. Supp. 531, 538
(S.D.N.Y. 1990); see also Maduff Mortgage Corp. v. Deloitte, Haskins & Sells, 779 P.2d
1083, 1086 (Or. Ct. App. 1989).
3. AICPA Auditing Standards, supra note 1, AU § 316.16.
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information is reasonably accurate. 4 It is critical that those who commis-
sion and rely upon an audit understand its limitations. Their occasional
failure to do so is often referred to by CPAs as the "expectation gap."'5
A properly performed audit's ability to prevent outright fraud is lim-
ited. Audits do not provide complete surety against systematic fraud. In-
stead, they provide only a certain degree of assurance that management's
financial statements are not materially misleading. Under GAAS, the au-
ditor adopts an attitude of professional skepticism in planning and con-
ducting an audit. Audits involve a rebuttable presumption, tested within
certain limits,6 that management is honest and that the client is not en-
gaged in systematic collusion to deceive the auditor and to misstate its
financial statements. The auditor does not assume that management is
trying to commit fraud and therefore turn over every leaf trying to find it.
But properly planned and executed audits will uncover material errors in
the financial statements, including certain types of accounting fraud. And
indeed, despite the contentions of some commentators and the big ac-
counting firms, this is exactly an audit's purpose.
B. EVALUATION OF AUDIT RISK
Audit risk is defined as "the risk that the auditor may unknowingly fail
to appropriately modify his opinion on financial statements that are ma-
terially misstated."' 7 Material errors may be the result of errors or irregu-
larities or both. Irregularities may involve management misappropriation
or misrepresentation. 8 SAS 47 and 82 assign the independent auditor the
responsibility for designing the audit to provide reasonable assurance of
detecting errors and irregularities that are material to the financial
statements.9
1. Components of Audit Risk
a. Inherent Risk
Inherent risk relates to the susceptibility of an account balance or class
of transactions to error that could be material assuming that there were
no related internal controls.10 Inherent risk can be increased by the
unique characteristics of the industry. Some industries have characteris-
tics that make the capture of transactions by the accounting system more
difficult. Such characteristics include, for example, a large amount of
small cash transactions. Such characteristics also include complex trans-
actions with difficult accounting estimates and calculations, such as those
4. See id., supra note 1, AU §§ 312.02, 316.10.
5. James W. Zisa, Guarding the Guardians: Expanding Auditor Negligence Liability to
Third-Party Users of Financial Information, 11 CAMPBELL L. REv. 123, 166 (1989).
6. See AICPA Auditing Standards, supra note 1, AU §§ 316.16, 316.08.
7. Id. at AU § 312.02.
8. See LARRY F. KONRATH, AUDITING CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS: A RISK-
ANALYSIS APPROACH 153 (1993).
9. See AICPA Auditing Standards, supra note 1, AU § 312.20.
10. See id., AU § 312.27(a).
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in the insurance and oil and gas industries.1 These characteristics in-
crease the complexity and uncertainty inherent in an audit.
b. Control Risk
Control risk is the risk that material errors or irregularities are not pre-
vented or detected by the company's internal accounting control struc-
ture and procedures.12 Auditors must assess the internal controls of a
company in order to determine the amount of control risk. 13 Control
weaknesses that auditors should look for include (1) failure to adequately
review transactions; (2) inadequate documentation; (3) unlimited access
to negotiable instruments, cash, and inventories; and (4) a lack of perpet-
ual inventory records.14 The training and proficiency of client employees
and the integrity of management are also key factors in assessing control
risk. 15 These are just a few examples of control weaknesses that can lead
to material errors in the financial statements. Together, inherent risk and
control risk determine the probability that the financial statements will
contain material errors.
c. Detection Risk
Detection risk is the risk that the errors or irregularities that are not
prevented or detected by the control structure are not detected by the
independent auditor.' 6 This is the only area of risk over which the audi-
tor has direct control. By increasing the amount of substantive audit pro-
cedures performed, the auditor can reduce detection risk.
2. Audit Risk Analysis
Audit risk analysis seeks to identify "areas presenting the highest
probability of material errors or irregularities, and those areas of the
greatest audit complexity.' 7 Audit risk can be viewed as a joint
probability of inherent risk, control risk, and detection risk. The follow-
ing equation expresses audit risk:
AR=IR xCR x DR
Where
AR = overall audit risk
IR = inherent risk
CR = control risk
11. See KONRATH, supra note 8, at 154.
12. See AICPA Auditing Standards, supra note 1, AU § 312.27(b).
13. See id., AU § 150.02 (Second standard of field work). Furthermore, SAS 55, as
amended by SAS 78, requires that an auditor obtain an understanding of a client's internal
control as a basis for planning the audit engagement. See id. AU § 319.
14. See KONRATH, supra note 8, at 154.
15. See id.
16. See AICPA Auditing Standards, supra note 1, AU § 312.27(c).
17. KONRATH, supra note 8, at 155.
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DR = detection risk 18
Overall audit risk should be reduced to the point at which the cost of
increasing the amount of audit procedures outweighs the expected bene-
fit. "Conservatism [suggests] that inherent risk should be set initially at
100%."19 Control risk is assessed based upon the auditor's evaluation of
the client's internal controls. The weaker the internal control structure,
the higher the control risk. Detection risk is the part of the equation that
is controllable by the auditor. Detection risk is reduced by increasing the
amount of substantive testing the auditor performs. The auditor makes
the most efficient use of substantive testing therefore, by identifying the
most risky areas for misstatements and irregularities. These areas are
either accounts or transactions with a higher inherent risk or areas where
the client has weak internal controls. The auditor obtains the optimal
amount of audit risk by identifying higher risk areas and performing sub-
stantive audit procedures to the point where the marginal benefit of the
additional procedures is outweighed by the marginal cost.
Highly leveraged companies, start-ups, and companies under financial
reporting pressures of various types are generally considered to represent
greater audit risk than firms in less volatile circumstances. The SAS in-
cludes the following as factors that may be relevant in assessing audit risk
(this list is not exhaustive):
A single individual dominates management, operating, and financial
decisions
- An aggressive attitude with respect to financial reporting
- A high turnover rate, particularly for senior accounting management
- Undue emphasis on achieving earnings projections
- Poor reputation of management in the business community
- Profitability is highly sensitive to economic factors
- A high failure rate in the industry.20
Auditors should consider these and other factors in determining a cli-
ent's audit risk. GAAS requires the auditor to design the audit proce-
dures to account for this risk.21 In order to conform to GAAS in cases
involving high audit risk, more elaborate audit procedures are required
than in a situation involving a lesser degree of audit risk.22
In certain cases, the third parties to whom management is required to
submit audited financial statements will often strongly influence the audi-
tor's evaluation of the degree of audit risk. These cases typically involve
creditors and certain loan covenants. For example, a highly leveraged
firm may have debt covenant agreements with its lenders that require it
to report that interest expense has not exceeded specified limits. In such
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See AICPA Auditing Standards, supra note 1, AU § 316.17.
21. See id., AU § 316.12.




a case, the auditor would take note of the heightened importance of this
account type and the fact that the firm's lending institutions will rely
upon the audited figures for interest expense in the financial statements.
This might indicate that additional audit procedures to test interest ex-
pense are appropriate, relative to a similar situation in which there are no
debt covenants. The additional audit procedures would probably be
deemed appropriate due to the heightened audit risk for this account
type.23
Judgments such as the auditor's evaluation of audit risk illustrate that,
although GAAS contain numerous specific requirements, it also contains
a very significant judgmental component. For this reason, at trial, the
question as to whether an audit firm has adhered to GAAS and met the
required standard of professional care is a question of fact for the trier of
fact to decide based on outside expert testimony and the other evidence
presented.2 4
As noted by the SAS, an auditor may change the evaluation of audit
risk once the audit has commenced.2 5 This uncertainty simply demon-
strates that public accounting, like every other business, has built-in risks
that participants must factor into their pricing. While auditors now per-
form most audits for a fixed fee, auditors are free to contract with their
clients for fee adjustments based on their good faith discovery of the need
for a more comprehensive audit. Clients may agree to bear an uncer-
tainty component in their audit fees to account for the occasional discov-
ery of unexpected audit risk, which requires additional substantive audit
procedures. Auditors generally have diversified client portfolios and are
in a position to absorb and spread this risk. Additionally, most audits are
multi-year engagements, and auditors should be able to adjust their fees
with increasing accuracy to reflect the appropriate degree of audit risk as
they gain greater experience with a client.
C. AUDIT REPORTS
When an audit is completed, the audit firm will issue copies of the fi-
nancial statements with the auditor's opinion attached directly to the cli-
ent's financial statements. The auditor's opinion states, usually in the
form recommended by the AICPA, that in the auditor's opinion, the fi-
nancial statements fairly present the company's financial position in ac-
cordance with GAAP, assuming such is the case.26 This is commonly
23. See AICPA Auditing Standards, supra note 1, AU §§ 316.14, 316.26, 312.17.
24. See Seaward Int'l v. Price Waterhouse, 391 S.E.2d 283, 287 (Va. 1990) ("The defini-
tion of 'generally accepted auditing standards,' and the application of that definition to the
facts of a particular case, are matters beyond the common knowledge of laymen.").
25. See AICPA Auditing Standards, supra note 1, AU § 316.25.
26. See id., AU § 508.08. The opinion, as recommended by the AICPA, reads:
We have audited the accompanying balance sheet of X Company as of [date]
and the related statements of income, retained earnings, and cash flows for
the year then ended. These financial statements are the responsibility of the
Company's management. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on
these financial statements based on our audit.
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known as an "unqualified" opinion.
When either circumstances did not permit a GAAS audit, or when the
auditor has other reasons for believing that the financial statements are
not in accordance with GAAP, the audit opinion may reflect such reser-
vations in what is termed a "qualified opinion. '27 In practice, this is
rarely done except in cases where the auditor's reservations are technical
in nature. The auditor and the client usually will work together to resolve
whatever issues stand in the way of an unqualified audit opinion.
D. WHY AUDITING IS DIFFERENT FROM OTHER
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES
Professionals such as physicians and attorneys generally owe their duty
of care exclusively to their clients. But the public accounting profession
insists that its members remain independent from their clients. The value
of the audit opinion rests upon the auditor's objective and disinterested
viewpoint, independent of the client's concerns. 28 Unlike the work prod-
uct of other professionals, third parties are often directly dependent upon
the auditor's work product.
In the modern economy, the public accounting profession primarily
functions to protect creditors and investors by helping to ensure that such
third parties have access to accurate financial information about the firms
with which they transact. The United States Supreme Court has acknowl-
edged the CPA's quasi-public role, stating:
By certifying the public reports that collectively depict a corpora-
tion's financial status, the independent auditor assumes a public re-
sponsibility transcending any employment relationship with the
client. The independent public accountant performing this special
function owes ultimate allegiance to the corporation's creditors and
stockholders, as well as to the investing public. 29
The public role of the independent accounting profession is central to
the controversy regarding the legal duty that auditors owe to third par-
ties. The fact that many different classes of economic actors, with whom
We conducted our audit in accordance with generally accepted auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to
obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free
of material misstatement. An audit includes examining, on a test basis, evi-
dence supporting the amounts and disclosures in the financial statements.
An audit also includes assessing the accounting principles used and signifi-
cant estimates made by management, as well as evaluating the overall finan-
cial statement presentation. We believe that our audit provides a reasonable
basis for our opinion.
In our opinion, the financial statements referred to above present fairly, in
all material respects, the financial position of X Company as of [date], and
the results of its operations and its cash flows for the year then ended in
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles.
Id.
27. See generally AICPA Auditing Standards, supra note 1, at AU §§ 508.35-.60.
28. See KONRATH, supra note 8, at 10.
29. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817-18 (1984).
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the auditor lacks privity, systematically rely upon audit opinions, coupled
with the characteristic of independence from the client, distinguishes the
auditing profession from most other professions. How to translate the
auditor's special role in the modem economy into a proper standard of
legal duty is the topic of this Comment.
E. AUDITOR INCENTIVES
Audit work provides tremendous revenue for the "Big Five" account-
ing firms.30 Each of the Big Five firms has revenue in the billions of dol-
lars. The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") requires
publicly traded companies to issue audited financial statements. Only the
large audit firms have the manpower to conduct many of these audits and
the name recognition to assure investors that the financial statements are
fairly presented. Therefore, the Big Five have a virtual monopoly on the
audit business for large, publicly-traded companies.
To maximize their profits, the big accounting firms staff even the big-
gest and most complicated audits with very young staff members. The
senior auditors, who manage the day-to-day work on an audit, are rarely
more than twenty-five or twenty-six years old. The staff members are
often twenty-two or twenty-three years old and not certified public ac-
countants. Auditors with less than three years experience do more than
50% of the work done on an audit. These junior accountants do the sub-
stantive audit work, review actual documents, and make certain judg-
ments as to the risk areas where more detailed work needs to be done.
While more experienced auditors are more likely to uncover errors and
material misstatements, the advantage of such staffing is higher profits for
the accounting firms, but at the expense of an increase in the probability
of serious problems with audits.
The audit industry has become very competitive despite being an oli-
gopoly. Corporations often put their audit work out for bids. The ac-
counting firms bid on these jobs for a predetermined fee. Auditors rarely
charge clients by the hour. With a fixed fee, the audit firms have incen-
tives to get the audits done with as few expenses as possible in terms of
staff time. Furthermore, firms often offer audits as a loss leader. Ac-
counting firms are willing to cut their audit fees to keep a foot in the chief
financial officer's door. Audits are used as a base to market the firms'
more lucrative consulting services.
When the young senior auditor or the manager hoping to become a
partner sees a problem, he may not be in a position to confront the client
with questions about the authenticity of the client's financial statements.
Causing client disenchantment or losing a client not only costs the firm
future audit fees, but also future consulting fees, which are substantially
30. The "Big Five" accounting firms include Pricewaterhouse Coopers, Arthur Ander-
sen & Co., Delloitte & Touche, KPMG Peat Marwick, and Ernst & Young.
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more lucrative. This market dynamic does not encourage auditors to act
independently.
But public accountants do have some incentive to maintain their repu-
tations as auditors. It is readily apparent that audit firms have an interest
in avoiding the scandal that attaches to audit failure.31 Investors will dis-
count the securities of companies that are audited by less reputable audit
firms.32 For example, the risk component of a loan will be higher for a
company that presents its creditors with financial statements audited by a
less reputable accounting firm. Accordingly, those creditors will penalize
these firms by increasing the cost of debt. Thus, an auditing firm will be
able to attract more clients at higher rates if it has a good professional
reputation.
A rational audit firm should be reluctant to create undue risk to its
reputation for the benefit of one client, since this might endanger the
firm's ability to retain and charge premium rates to its entire portfolio of
clients. 33 Most accounting firms (and all of the Big Five firms) possess
diversified client portfolios. Therefore, the benefit derived by an auditor
for providing a misleading audit for one client may be slight compared to
the effect that a reputation for negligence will impose on the fees that it
can charge the rest of its clients. 34 This is a key difference between audit
firms and the management of the companies being audited. A company's
managers may not be deterred by reputational forces due to their rela-
tively undiversified risk portfolios. On the other hand, a typical audit
firm has a much stronger incentive to preserve its reputation within the
financial community.
A company's management may attempt to shop the market for an au-
ditor with an acceptable reputation, but who is nevertheless willing to
tolerate an excessive degree of risk that the financial statements will con-
tain material departures from GAAP. Such a strategy may be effective,
since third parties cannot always sort out the good auditors from the bad
ones, and information costs to determine the reputation of the audit firm,
the particular office, and the particular partner in charge are high.
35
While the fact that most large companies are audited by one of only five
auditing firms may suggest that information costs, at least for larger firms,
are lower, that may not be the case. Offices within these large interna-
tional firms may vary in terms of quality and ethics, making it more diffi-
cult to rely on a firm's reputation.
Additionally, as a CPA firm branch office's or a particular partner's
relationship with a client grows over time, it may become more willing to
tolerate questionable accounting because of its reluctance to endanger its
31. See Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforce-
ment Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 63 (1986).
32. See id. at 96-97.
33. See id. at 71.
34. See id.
35. See id. at 96-97.
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relationship with a lucrative client.36 This is especially true when the ac-
counting firm is also providing extensive consulting services to the client.
A local office of a big firm may tolerate questionable reporting practices
by a key client, despite the possibility that over time this might degrade
the overall reputation of the firm.
Auditor liability helps prevent audit firms and their clients from exter-
nalizing the costs of material misstatements and negligent audits.
Although some auditors will not compromise, or unduly risk their reputa-
tions for integrity regardless of the financial incentives involved, across an
entire market we must assume that auditors will tend to react in an eco-
nomically rational manner to cost-benefit incentives. 37 Accordingly, au-
ditors may be expected to weigh the financial benefits of tolerating or
risking material misstatements in the financial statements against the ex-
pected costs of doing so.
Auditor liability to third parties raises the expected cost of conducting
a negligent audit. The reasons civil liability directed at firms or their
management are ineffective as a means of deterring financial fraud do not
apply to audit firms. Unlike managers, audit firms do not typically face
insolvency if a single client becomes bankrupt. An audit firm has an in-
centive to avoid a civil liability judgment that might result from an audit
failure, since the auditor, unlike its client, will expect to be around after-
ward to pay it.
Auditor liability can thus provide a strong disincentive to negligence by
forcing audit firms to bear the costs of their own negligence, rather than
forcing third-party users of financial statements to bear these costs (i.e.,
third parties believe that a firm performed a GAAS audit when it has, in
fact, performed a negligent audit). Auditor liability can force both audi-
tors and their clients to internalize the costs of material misstatements in
the financial statements by motivating auditors to use due care in per-
forming the audit. These necessary steps include closely adhering to the
general standards and the standards of field work. 38 Under these stan-
dards, the auditor is required to gain a thorough understanding of the
client's internal accounting system and do the necessary substantive pro-
cedures to lower overall audit risk to an acceptable level. These neces-
sary steps require the clients to pay larger audit fees. These fees
internalize the costs of possible material misstatements in the financial
statements to the auditor's clients. Clients can, in turn, increase the level
of internal control and thus reduce the control risk assessment by the
auditors. Reducing control risk lowers the amount of substantive testing
required, which lowers audit fees. Thus, auditor liability not only ensures
that the auditors conduct the audit properly, but also encourages audit
clients to set up accurate and well-controlled financial reporting systems
to avoid higher audit fees.
36. See id. at 63.
37. See id. at 67-68.
38. See AICPA Auditing Standards, supra note 1, AU § 150.02.
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These business realities are part of the reason that it is important to
have a vigorous civil remedy for bad audit work. Lawsuits over bad au-
dits are not a sign that something is wrong with the civil justice system,
but a sign that there are problems with the audit industry that the big
accounting firms have not fully addressed.
Despite these strong arguments in favor of a vigorous civil remedy for
bad audits, the courts have consistently sought ways to limit auditor lia-
bility. These attempts, as will be seen in the discussion in the next sec-
tion, have no sound theoretical basis. The following cases demonstrate
the extent to which judges fail to understand the role of auditors in the
modern economy and the purpose and procedures of an audit.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF THE COMMON LAW DOCTRINES
OF AUDITOR LIABILITY
A. INTRODUCTION
As noted above, the controversy regarding auditor liability is compli-
cated because the plaintiff is generally a party or parties who foreseeably
relied upon the audited financial statements, but did not contract with the
auditor to do the audit. Such plaintiffs might be trade creditors or bank-
ers who routinely require a firm to submit audited financial statements as
a prerequisite to receiving short- or long-term credit. Other potential
plaintiffs include investors, who also typically rely upon audited financial
statements to make the decision whether to invest.
In the usual case, a third party will request and receive an audited fi-
nancial report directly from the client firm's management and use it in
deciding whether to transact with the firm. The firm later encounters fi-
nancial difficulties, perhaps resulting in insolvency, causing it to default
on its obligations to the third party. The audited financial statements,
which had seemed to indicate that the firm was on a sound financial foot-
ing, will prove to be incorrect or fraudulent, and the auditor will have
failed to detect the errors. With the client now insolvent, the third party
will seek to recover damages from the audit firm, which it perceives to
possess the financial capacity to compensate it for damages, since the au-
dit firm, unlike its client, is still solvent and perhaps insured.
The plaintiff will allege that all the elements for a tort action against
the auditor are present. It will contend that the auditor owed a duty to
typical third-party users of financial statements to perform its audit with
due care. The plaintiff will contend the auditor breached this duty of care
since the auditor failed to uncover material errors in the financial state-
ments. The plaintiff will allege that it materially and detrimentally relied
upon the audited financial statements in making its decision to transact
with the auditor's client. Often the auditor will respond with a motion for
summary judgment, citing the third party's lack of privity with the auditor
and contending that the auditor owed a legal duty of care only to his or
her client, and not to third parties.
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Such cases raise several issues. The primary issue is whether the audi-
tor has a duty to third-party users of the financial statements that it has
audited, or whether they owe this duty only to their clients. This issue is
essentially whether the dispute sounds in tort or contract law. Secondly,
there is the issue of whether the failure of an audit to detect fraudulent
accounting by management actually represents a breach of the profes-
sional duty of care. Third, there is an issue as to what extent did the
breach of professional care by the auditor actually contribute to the dam-
ages of the third party. The third party's decision to transact with the
defunct client that resulted in the damages may have been caused by a
multitude of factors in addition to the auditor's negligent unqualified
opinion.
For nearly fifty years the issue of auditor liability to third parties has
been dominated by the issue of what should be the scope of the auditor's
liability to third parties and whether tort or contract law should govern.
Under contract law, third parties must establish that they were the in-
tended, rather than incidental, beneficiaries of the contract between the
auditor and the client firm at the time the parties contracted. 39 Classic
negligence tort doctrine, on the other hand, does not require privity be-
tween tortfeasor and plaintiff. Whether courts find auditor liability to lie
in contract or tort law is therefore critical, since if contract law governs,
only those parties who meet the strict criteria as third-party beneficiaries
will have standing to sue.
For decades, auditor liability to third parties lay within the realm of
contract law, with its strict requirements of privity and third-party benefi-
ciary criteria. Some jurisdictions have abandoned a contract-based theory
of liability in favor of a negligence standard with an expanded scope of
auditor liability to third parties. But the question of precisely which third
parties are owed a duty of care by a firm's independent auditor in cases
involving audit failure remains contentious.
B. THE PRIVITY AND PRIMARY BENEFIT STANDARD
1. Ultramares: The Establishment of the Privity Standard
The seminal case regarding the liability of auditors to third-party users
of audited financial statements is the famous case of Ultramares Corp. v.
Touche.40 In this case, the New York Court of Appeals, in an opinion
written by Justice Cardozo, established the "privity" standard for auditor
liability.41 This standard limits the liability of the independent auditor to
those with whom the auditor has privity of contract, and to third-party
beneficiaries. 42
39. See generally JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CON-
TRACMI § 17-2 (3d. ed. 1987).





In Ultramares, the independent auditing firm, Touche, Niven & Co.
("Touche"), rendered an unqualified audit opinion of the balance sheet of
Fred Stern Company ("Stern"). 43 The management of Stern had re-
corded certain material fraudulent accounting transactions that caused
the financial statements to paint a rosy financial picture when, in reality,
the firm was on the verge of insolvency. Touche failed to detect the man-
agement fraud because the Touche auditors fell short of an adequate level
of professional care while conducting the audit.44 Touche did not per-
form such fundamental auditing procedures as verifying the worth of ac-
counts receivables or the existence and value of inventories. The trier of
fact determined that Touche was fully aware of Stern's plans to submit
the audit report to creditors to obtain working capital, and in fact had
printed serial-numbered copies of the report to Stern apparently to con-
trol the distribution of the financial statements for this purpose.
After the audit, Stern filed for bankruptcy. Ultramares, a creditor of
Stern, claimed that when it made its decision to extend credit to Stern, it
relied upon the Touche audit report and was now faced with having to
write-off its loan balance to Stem. It sued Touche alleging tort liability
under negligence theory.
Despite concluding that Touche performed its audit negligently, 45 and
despite the fact that the court concluded that it was reasonably foresee-
able that Stern would submit the audit report to trade creditors such as
Ultramares who would rely upon it,46 the court held that Touche was not
liable to Ultramares for damages. Applying contract law, the court held
that auditors owed a legal duty of professional care only to those with
whom they contracted, or to those users of the financial statements that
auditor and client specifically agreed, at the time of the audit, would re-
ceive the financial statements as third-party beneficiaries to the audit en-
gagement.47 The court further justified this narrow scope of liability on
the theory that a broader scope would impose potentially crushing liabil-
ity upon the auditing profession and would "expose accountants to a lia-
bility in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an
indeterminate class."'48
The court distinguished between cases involving negligence and those
involving outright or "constructive" fraud on the part of the auditor. In
the case of fraud, the court held that third partiec could bring suit in
tort.49 This therefore left the door open for tort suits against audit firms
in situations in which their failure to exercise due care is sufficiently reck-
less as to constitute "constructive fraud."
43. See id. at 442-43.
44. See id. at 444.
45. See id. at 443.
46. See id., at 442.
47. See id, at 444-49.
48. Id. at 444.
49. See id. at 448.
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2. Credit Alliance: The Primary Benefit Standard
In New York, the Ultramares privity scope of liability for auditors re-
mains essentially unchanged to this day. A number of other jurisdictions
have followed Ultramares, which was the dominant American doctrine
regarding the scope of auditor liability for many decades. 50 It was upheld
and refined by a 1985 New York decision, Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur
Andersen & Co.5 1 This opinion actually involved two separate actions,
consolidated into a single opinion, in which accountants were being sued
by third-party users who had detrimentally relied on audited financial
statements containing material misstatements of financial condition.52
The court's differential treatment of the two cases is instructive. The
facts of the first case closely resembled those in Ultramares. L.B. Smith,
Inc. ("Smith"), a capital intensive enterprise that regularly required
working capital financing, hired Arthur Andersen & Co. ("Andersen"), a
"Big Eight" 53 accounting firm, to audit Smith's consolidated financial
statements. Plaintiffs required audited financial statements from Smith
each year as a precondition to continued financing. For the years 1977 to
1979, Andersen issued an unqualified audit report on Smith's financial
statements. The trier of fact found that plaintiffs relied on these audited
financial statements in deciding to extend significant amounts of working
capital financing. 54
Despite a string of unqualified opinions issued by Andersen, the jury
found that the financial statements materially overstated the value of
Smith's assets, net worth, and financial condition. In 1980, Smith filed for
bankruptcy, having defaulted on several millions of dollars in obligations
to the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs brought suit claiming both professional negli-
gence and fraud by Andersen in the conduct of its audit and the prepara-
tion of its reports. Plaintiffs established that because of Smith's capital-
intensive nature, it had been completely foreseeable by Andersen that
creditors, such as plaintiffs, would rely on the financial statements as
third-party users.55
The second case in the opinion, European American Bank & Trust Co.
v. Strauhs & Kaye,56 involved facts similar to the first, but with a critical
difference. European American Bank & Trust ("EAB") had extended
credit to Majestic Electro Industries and certain of its subsidiaries from
50. See Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 483 N.E.2d 110, 118-19 (N.Y.
1985).
51. 483 N.E.2d 110 (N.Y. 1985).
52. See id. at 111-14.
53. A series of mergers have reduced the "Big Eight" to the "Big Five." Two
megamergers occurred in 1989 when Ernst & Whinney merged with Arthur Young to form
Ernst & Young and Touche Ross merged with Deloitte, Haskins & Sells to form Deloitte
& Touche. For eight years this group was known as the "Big Six." Then in 1997, Price
Waterhouse and Coopers & Lybrand merged to form Pricewaterhouse Coopers - reducing
the number to five.
54. See Credit Alliance Corp., 483 N.E.2d at 111.
55. See id. at 111-12.
56. 102 A.D.2d 776, aff'd sub nom. Credit Alliance Corp., 483 N.E. at 112-1.3.
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1979 through 1982, relying upon unqualified audit opinions rendered by
Strauhs & Kaye ("S&K"), an auditing firm. In late 1982, Majestic de-
faulted on its loans, causing significant losses to EAB.57 EAB subse-
quently sued S&K, alleging that the S&K-audited financial statements
materially misstated Majestic's inventories and accounts receivables,
painted an overall false picture of its financial health, and failed to dis-
close significant inadequacies in Majestic's internal accounting controls. 58
But unlike the situation involving Credit Alliance, the audit firm was
aware that its client would use the audit report primarily to obtain credit.
Furthermore, S&K had frequent direct meetings and other communica-
tions with EAB regarding EAB's reliance on the S&K audits.59
In each case, the intermediate appellate court concluded that the plain-
tiffs were members of a limited class-suppliers of working capital
credit-whose reliance upon the financial statements should have been
specifically foreseen by the auditors, and as such, the plaintiffs fell within
an exception to the general rule requiring privity to bring suit against an
auditor for negligence. 60
The New York Court of Appeals, however, distinguished the Andersen
litigation from that involving S&K by noting that S&K had direct knowl-
edge of, as well as communications with, the third-party user of its audit
report, whereas Andersen had never directly communicated with Credit
Alliance. Upholding Ultramares, the court enumerated a three-part test
to determine whether a court may hold accountants liable in tort to par-
ties with whom they had not contracted. This test distinguishes situations
such as Ultramares, in which the auditor has had no direct communication
with the third party bringing suit, from situations in which communication
between the auditor and the plaintiff has occurred.
The opinion explained that to hold accountants liable in negligence to
non-contractual parties who rely to their detriment on inaccurate finan-
cial reports, certain circumstances must be present:
(1) the accountants must have been aware that the financial reports
were to be used for a particular purpose or purposes; (2) in the fur-
therance of which a known party or parties was intended to rely; and
(3) there must have been some conduct on the part of the account-
ants linking them to that party or parties, which indicates the ac-
countant's understanding of that party or parties' reliance. 61
A key feature of the privity doctrine, as enumerated in Ultramares and
Credit Alliance, is the crucial distinction it draws between third-party
users that are specifically known to the auditor, and members of a fore-
seeable class of users who are, nevertheless, not specifically known in
advance.
57. See Credit Alliance Corp., 483 N.E.2d at 113.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See id. at 120.
61. Id. at 118.
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Making a critical distinction between foreseeable but unidentified firms
on the one hand, and firms whose reliance happens to be known specifi-
cally to the auditor on the other, is overly legalistic. Furthermore, it dem-
onstrates the New York Court of Appeal's basic misunderstanding of
what auditing is and how audits are conducted. As discussed above in
Part I, who relies on the audited financial statement has little or nothing
to do with how the auditor conducts the audit. Audit tests are driven by
the types of transactions the client conducts, the client's internal account-
ing system, and the integrity of the management. 62 These are the factors
auditors take into account when determining audit risk. The auditor's
assessment of inherent risk and control risk, in turn, determines what sub-
stantive tests are performed and the extent of those tests. While certain
types of transactions, such as short-term working capital financing like in
Credit Alliance and European American, may indicate one type of user
(finance companies), the auditor's duty and standard of care does not
change because the auditor knows the name of the person who is relying
on his or her work.
Certain jurisdictions have declined to attach great importance to this
illogical distinction and have abandoned the Ultramares standard in favor
of a foreseeability standard. Criticism of the rigid privity standard was
also a factor in the adoption of section 552 of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts, which adopted an intermediate position between a true negli-
gence regime, and the contract law approach of Ultramares.63 A number
of jurisdictions have adopted the Restatement position. The remainder
of this section examines leading cases for each liability standard.
C. THE FORESEEABILITY STANDARD
Some states hold accountants liable to all reasonably foreseeable users
of financial statements.64 But even under this standard with the broadest
scope of liability to third parties, courts sometimes erect artificial limits
on auditors' liability to some third parties that common sense tells us are
"foreseeable."
1. H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler
In H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler,65 the Supreme Court of New Jersey
considered a common law negligence suit brought against a company's
independent auditors by third parties who allegedly relied upon the com-
62. See AICPA Auditing Standards, supra note 1, at AU § 342.10.
63. See generally H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138, 145 (N.J. 1983) (explain-
ing that widespread criticism of the privity standard in Ultramares resulted in the enumera-
tion of broader scope of liability in the Restatement (Second) of Torts).
64. See, e.g., Wirtz v. Switzer, 586 So. 2d 775, 780 (Miss. 1991) (holding that an ac-
countant will be liable for any loss suffered by reasonably foreseeable users if the loss was
proximately caused by the accountant's negligence); see also H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler,
444 A.2d 66, 67 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982), affid in part, rev'd in part, 461 A.2d 138
(N.J. 1983).
65. 461 A.2d 138 (N.J. 1983).
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pany's audited financial statements in carrying out a merger transaction.
Touche Ross & Co. ("Touche") issued unqualified audit reports for the
years 1969 through 1972 for Giant Stores Corporation ("Giant"). In
1971, the plaintiffs, Rosenblum Inc. and Summit Promotions, Inc., con-
summated a merger agreement with Giant, whereby plaintiffs would re-
ceive an amount of Giant stock to be determined by a formula based
upon Giant's net income in the fiscal year subsequent to the completion
of the merger. Accordingly, plaintiffs allegedly relied upon both the his-
torical and the 1972 audited financial statements in order to determine
the value of the Giant stock in the merger transaction. One of the
Touche partners was present during portions of the merger negotiations,
although apparently not as a negotiator. Giant stock was publicly traded
on the American Stock Exchange.
After the completion of the merger, the plaintiff discovered that Gi-
ant's management fraudulently distorted the company's financial records.
Specifically, management recorded nonexistent assets and materially un-
derstated accounts payable liabilities. Therefore, the 1971 and 1972 fi-
nancial statements, upon which Touche had rendered unqualified audit
opinions, concealed the fact that Giant was on the verge of insolvency.
Trading in Giant stock was suspended and never resumed. The stock be-
came worthless, and Touche withdrew its 1972 audit report. Giant subse-
quently filed for bankruptcy, and litigation ensued. Plaintiffs brought suit
against Touche for fraudulent misrepresentation, gross negligence, negli-
gence, and breach of warranty. Touche moved for summary judgment
based upon the Ultramares privity doctrine.66
The Rosenblum court declined to follow Ultramares and rejected that
court's policy rationale of crushing liability. Citing public policy ratio-
nales of deterrence, allocative efficiency, and superior ability to insure,
the Rosenblum court determined that auditors should be liable in tort to
foreseeable third-party users of the financial statements.67 The opinion
stated:
Certified financial statements have become the benchmark for vari-
ous reasonably foreseeable business purposes and accountants have
been engaged to satisfy those ends. In those circumstances account-
ing firms should no longer be permitted to hide within the citadel of
privity and avoid liability for their malpractice. The public interest
will be served by the rule we promulgate this day.68
The court noted that the role of the auditor, unlike other professionals,
inherently involves a duty to others besides the client with whom he or
she has privity, and in fact requires the auditor to remain independent
from the affairs of the client.69 The opinion rejected the concern ex-
pressed by the New York Court of Appeals in Ultramares that a foresee-
66. See id.
67. See id. at 152.




ability standard would lead to "extreme" liability for auditors. 70 To the
contrary, the Rosenblum court concluded that accounting firms were in
the better position, relative to foreseeable third-party users of audit re-
ports, to spread or insure against the costs of auditor malpractice. 71 The
court further noted the deterrent effect of a negligence standard. The
court stated that such a liability standard encourages higher professional
standards within the auditing profession and possibly reduces the inci-
dence of accountant malpractice litigation:
The imposition of a duty to foreseeable users may cause accounting
firms to engage in more thorough reviews. This might entail setting
up stricter standards and applying closer supervision, which should
tend to reduce the number of instances in which liability would en-
sue. Much of the additional costs incurred either because of more
thorough auditing review or increased insurance premiums would be
borne by the business entity and its stockholders or its customers. 72
This foreseeability standard requires plaintiffs to fully satisfy the ele-
ments of a negligence claim: (1) duty, which is established by the foresee-
able reliance of the third party; (2) a breach of the auditor's duty of
professional care; (3) causation; and (4) damages, which would be limited
to actual losses due to the reliance on the misstatement.73 The court also
mentioned ways in which the auditor could proactively limit liability, such
as limiting the applicability of the opinion in the actual audit report or
indemnification of the auditor by the client.74
The opinion placed negligent misrepresentation by accountants in the
same realm as products liability for manufacturers, concluding that the
policy rationales supporting liability are essentially the same for both.75
The opinion stated that "[i]t is clear that an action for negligence with
respect to an injury arising out of a defective product may be maintained
without privity. The negligence involved may be that ascribable to negli-
gent misrepresentation. '76
Unfortunately, the opinion does not seem to totally abandon contract
law for tort principles. With respect to the scope of third parties to whom
the auditor owes a duty of care, the opinion actually states that "[t]he
plaintiffs would have to establish that they received the audited state-
ments from the company pursuant to a proper company purpose, [and]
that they, in accordance with that purpose, relied on the state-
ments . . . . 77 On its face, this language appears somewhat more restric-
tive than a pure foreseeability standard that would hold the auditor liable
to any third party that relied upon the audited financial report, regardless
of how he or she had obtained it. The "proper company purpose" stipu-
70. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931).




75. See id. at 145-46.
76. Id. at 146.
77. Id. at 152.
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lation, along with the court's suggestion that the auditor could limit liabil-
ity by expressly stating use limitations in the body of the opinion, has
been cited as an indication that the court intended to stop short of a pure
foreseeability standard of liability. 78 This is further suggested by this
statement in the court's opinion:
Thus, for example, an institutional investor or portfolio manager who
does not obtain audited statements from the company would not
come within the stated principle. Nor would stockholders who
purchased the stock after a negligent audit be covered in the absence
of demonstrating the necessary conditions precedent. Those and
similar cases beyond the stated rule are not before us and we express
no opinion with respect to such situations.79
So there is still a question of what is a "proper company purpose."
Clearly this applies to bank creditors who receive the audited financial
statements from the client. It also clearly applies to parties who are nego-
tiating a merger or similar transaction with the client. It seems from the
opinion, however, that investors who buy stock or bonds in a company in
the secondary market or in an initial public offering from an underwriter
are not covered. One "proper company purpose" is certainly to promote
active trading and liquidity in a company's securities. Without liquidity,
the value of the securities declines substantially. Audited financial state-
ments provide the reliable information necessary to have an active secon-
dary market. Therefore, it seems an arbitrary cut-off for the New Jersey
Supreme Court to allow bank creditors to sue auditors for negligence but
not other "unforeseen" investors.
2. Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co.
Almost immediately after the Rosenblum decision, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court, in a question of first impression in that state, also placed
auditor liability within the realm of negligence doctrine in Citizens State
Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co.80 In this case, Clintonville Fire Appara-
tus, Inc. ("CFA") had retained Timm, Schmidt & Co. ("Timm"), an in-
dependent auditing firm, to audit its financial statements for the years
1973 through 1976. Timm issued an unqualified audit opinion for the
years 1974-76, but disclaimed from issuing an opinion for 1973 for reasons
not completely clear from the record. 81 After reviewing the financial in-
formation contained in the audited financial report, Citizens State Bank
("Citizens") loaned $300,000 to CFA.
Subsequent to the issuance of the loan, during its 1976 audit, Timm
discovered that the 1974 and 1975 financial statements contained a
number of errors that materially overstated the company's financial
health. Once these errors were corrected, Timm informed Citizens of the
78. See Thomas L. Gossman, The Fallacy of Expanding Accountant's Liability, 1988
COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 213, 224 (1988).
79. Rosenblum, 461 A.2d at 153.
80. 335 N.W.2d 361 (Wis. 1983).
81. See id. at 362.
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errors. Citizens called its loans due, and as a result CFA became bank-
rupt. Citizens filed an action against Timm alleging liability in tort.
Timm filed a motion to dismiss based upon the privity doctrine.82
The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the lower court, which had
found for Timm, and determined that "an accountant may be held liable
to a third party not in privity for the negligent preparation of an audit
report under the principles of Wisconsin negligence law" 83 and remanded
for retrial on that basis. Citing Rosenblum, the court based its decision on
the same public policy grounds of deterrence and the court's belief that
auditing firms are in the superior position to spread and insure against
the costs of audit malpractice. 84
Noting that the third-party use of audited financial statements is rou-
tine and foreseeable, the opinion placed the issue of liability to third par-
ties firmly in the realm of negligence law, explaining that "[t]he
fundamental principle of Wisconsin negligence law is that a tortfeasor is
fully liable for all foreseeable consequences of his act except as those
consequences are limited by policy factors."8 5 The court rejected the
middle ground of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, stating that "[t]he
Restatement's statement of limiting liability to certain third parties is too
restrictive a statement of policy factors for this Court to adopt. '86
D. THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS STANDARD
The need to provide some relief to third-party users of audited finan-
cial statements, largely denied by the Ultramares doctrine of privity, was a
factor in the formulation of section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, which is titled "Information Negligently Supplied for the Guidance
of Others."'8 7 The Restatement is widely viewed as an intermediate stan-
dard of liability, establishing a duty of auditors to third parties that is
narrower in scope than ordinary tort negligence doctrine, but broader in
scope than the privity standard.88 Various interpretations of the Restate-
ment standard of liability have replaced the privity standard in a majority
of U.S. jurisdictions.8 9
The standard set forth in the Restatement provides:
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employ-
ment, or in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary inter-
est, supplies false information for the guidance of others in their
business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused
82. See id. at 362-63.
83. Id. at 362.
84. See id. at 366.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977).
88. See Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, 367 S.E.2d 609, 617
(N.C. 1988) (stating that the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 "constitutes a middle
ground between the restrictive Ultramares approach . .. and the expansive 'reasonably
foreseeable' approach.").
89. See Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 752 (Cal. 1992).
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to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails
to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communi-
cating the information.
(2) ... [t]he liability stated in subsection (1) is limited to loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose
benefit and guidance he intends to supply the information or
knows that the recipient intends to supply it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the
information to influence or knows that the recipient so intends or
in a substantially similar transaction.90
This standard falls short of a complete negligence regime because it
essentially limits liability to classes of third parties that the auditor has
actually foreseen, rather than parties that are reasonably foreseeable. It
has been interpreted in a variety of ways by jurisdictions that nominally
adhere to it. It can be interpreted broadly or narrowly, depending on
how the court defines "limited group of persons" or "substantially similar
transaction." 91 For example, in Simpson v. Specialty Retail Concepts,
Inc.92 a North Carolina federal court found that public market investors
can constitute a limited class. In doing so, the court noted that "the ad-
jective 'Iimited' . . . pertains not to size, but to identifiability. '93 Under
such a broad interpretation of the Restatement, the Restatement ap-
proach differs little from the foreseeability approach discussed above.
But in most jurisdictions, the Restatement test is satisfied only in situa-
tions where the audit is used for a specific limited purpose, such as the
sale of a corporation or an extension of credit. 94
90. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977).
91. The question of whether the plaintiff falls under a "limited group of persons" is a
question of fact. See Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. James, 466 S.W.2d 873, 879 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e) (adopting the Restatement approach); Blue Bell,
Inc. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 715 S.W.2d 408, 412 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (rejecting a strict interpretation of the Restatement approach and holding that
whether a person falls within the limited class of persons to whom a duty is owed is a fact
issue).
92. 908 F. Supp. 323,331-32 (M.D.N.C. 1995); see also In re Sahlen & Assoc., Inc., 773
F. Supp 342, 373-74 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (applying Florida law, the court held that institutional
investors in a corporation could maintain a negligence action against the corporation's au-
ditors under the Restatement because the institutional investors alleged that the account-
ants knew that they would be acting in reliance on the audit report, but holding that
investors who had purchased shares of the corporation in the open market could not main-
tain a negligence action).
93. Simpson, 908 F. Supp. at 331 (explaining that the word "limited" in § 552 of the
Restatement (Second) referred not to a group's size, but to identifiability); see also
Guenther v. Cooper Life Sciences, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 1437, 1443 (N.D. Cal. 1990)
("[W]here a group is identifiable, accountants and other information providers are not
relieved of liability merely because the group of people whom they intend to influence with
their information is too large.").
94. See Nycal Corp. v. KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, 688 N.E.2d 1368, 1373 (Mass. 1998)
(interpreting § 552 to limit an accountant's potential liability to noncontractual third par-
ties who can establish the accountant's actual knowledge of the limited group of third par-
ties that will rely on the audited financial statements as well as actual knowledge of the
particular financial transaction that the audit report will be used to influence).
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1. Raritan River Steel: The Restatement Approach
In Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland,95 the North
Carolina Supreme Court considered which scope of liability to third par-
ties to adopt in that state. In Raritan, creditors of Intercontinental Metals
Corporation ("IMC") alleged that they had detrimentally relied upon an
audit report that contained materially misstated financial data due to the
auditor's negligent audit. The case is illustrative because, at the time it
was considered, all three liability standards existed. 96 The opinion con-
cluded that the Restatement (Second) approach represented the best ap-
proach to auditor liability to third parties because it took a "middle
ground" between foreseeability and privity.
The court rejected the privity approach, stating that it did not ade-
quately provide for the crucial role played by independent auditors in the
financial world and the systematic reliance placed on audit reports by
investors and lenders.97 On the other hand, the court declined to adopt
the foreseeability standard adopted in Citizens State Bank and Rosen-
blum, stating that the foreseeability approach results in "liability more
expansive than an accountant should be expected to bear." 98
The opinion criticized the Rosenblum court's conclusion that public
policy did not justify disparate treatment between accounting firms, on
the one hand, and manufacturing firms that are subject to products liabil-
ity on the other. The court reasoned, in language similar to the "indeter-
minate" language in Ultramares, that while manufacturers and designers
can limit their potential liability by limiting the quantity of their product,
auditors "have no control over the distribution of their reports, and hence
lack control over their exposure to liability." 99 The court was apparently
uncomfortable with abandoning contract law in favor of negligence. The
opinion distinguished between manufacturers, who typically expect that
their product will be used by a wide field of users unknown to them, and
audit firms, who perform their services under contract to a single client.
The court held that the Restatement approach "prevents extension of
liability in situations where the accountant 'merely knows of the ever-
present possibility of repetition to anyone, and the possibility of action in
reliance upon [the audited financial statements]:'"100 But the court ap-
pears to have interpreted the Restatement approach fairly broadly:
The Restatement's text does not demand that the accountant be in-
formed by the client himself of the audit report's intended use. The
text requires only that the auditor know that his client intends to
supply information to another person or limited group of persons.
Whether the auditor acquires this knowledge from his client or else-
where should make no difference. If he knows at the time he
95. 367 S.E.2d 609 (N.C. 1988).
96. See id. at 614.
97. See id. at 615.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 616.
100. Id. at 617 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 552 cmt. h).
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prepares his report that specific persons, or a limited group of per-
sons, will rely on his work, and intends or knows that this client in-
tends such reliance, his duty of care should extend to them. 01
The court concluded that those creditors that had relied upon the ac-
tual audited financial statements were owed a duty by the audit firm be-
cause the audit firm knew: "(1) the statements would be used by IMC to
represent its financial condition to creditors who would extend credit on
the basis of the report, and (2) plaintiff and other creditors would rely
upon the audit report. '10 2
This opinion appears to indicate that the court interpreted the Restate-
ment scope of liability broadly enough to impose on auditors a duty of
care to all trade creditors who can show reliance upon the audit report if
the auditor is aware that the company will use the audit report in order to
obtain credit. Thus, the court held that trade creditors represent a "fore-
seeable class" under the Restatement. Once again, the court's opinion
with regard to trade creditors as a "foreseeable class" begs the question-
are trade creditors any more foreseeable than other investors?
Interestingly, the court discussed the inherent reliance by an auditor
upon his or her client's records, assertions, and integrity as further evi-
dence that audit firms have less control over their work product than do
manufacturers, and therefore reasoned that auditors should have a more
limited scope of liability than a negligence regime would provide. 10 3 As
was discussed above in Part I, this is actually one of the reasons why audi-
tors should be held to a negligence standard of liability. This argument is
further developed in Part III.
2. Bily v. Arthur Young & Co.
In Bily v. Arthur Young & Co.,10 4 the California Supreme Court re-
treated from its previous foreseeability standard in favor of a restrictive
interpretation of the Restatement scope of liability. In the facts sur-
rounding this well-known case, Osborne Computer Co. ("Osborne") had
created a sensation by creating the world's first mass-produced portable
microcomputer, which was also "bundled" with popular software applica-
tions. There was clearly a large and untapped market for portable com-
puters, particularly among business travelers, and Osborne's sales
skyrocketed. The company sought large amounts of bridge capital to en-
able it to continue expanding operations in advance of an initial public
offering ("IPO"). Many individual investors bought stock from the com-
pany's founders. Others issued standby letters of credit in return for war-
rants that would permit them to purchase stock immediately after the
IPO at a below-market price. 105 In advance of the IPO, Osborne hired
101. Raritan River Steel Co., 367 S.E.2d at 618.
102. Id.
103. See id. at 616.
104. 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992).
105. See Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 271 Cal. Rptr. 470, 490 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990),
rev'd, 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992).
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the "Big Eight" CPA auditing firm of Arthur Young & Co. ("AY") to
perform an audit of the company's 1981 and 1982 financial statements.
The audited financial statements reported a net operating loss of approxi-
mately $1,000,000 in 1981 on sales of $6,000,000. Indicating a trend to-
wards profitability, the income statement reported a modest $69,000
operating profit in 1982 on skyrocketing sales of $68,000,000.106
It was subsequently discovered that Osborne had, in fact, incurred a
substantial 1982 net operating loss in 1982 of approximately $3,000,000.
Osborne's market position subsequently deteriorated, and sales declined
due to the failed introduction of a follow-up product and the entry of
several new competitors, including IBM, into the microcomputer market.
Consequently, the IPO never materialized and the company filed for
bankruptcy. The stock and warrants were now worthless, and creditors
faced a write-off of their loans.
A mass of litigation against AY ensued, brought by investors and credi-
tors that had allegedly relied upon the AY-audited financial statements.
Expert testimony identified over forty major deficiencies in AY's audit.
These deficiencies appeared to constitute gross negligence. The plaintiff's
evidence indicated that AY failed to follow GAAS during the audit and
that the audit team failed to follow standard AY audit procedures.10 7
This allegedly caused AY to fail to act upon various material errors in
Osborne's accounting records and flaws in its accounting practices.
For example, members of the audit team had discovered significant de-
viations from proper accounting practices, as well as material defects in
Osborne's internal accounting controls. These defects had allowed
$1,300,000 in liabilities to remain unrecorded in Osborne's financial
records. These findings were not disclosed either as qualifications to the
audit opinion or in the report to Osborne's board of directors. Based on
such shortcomings in AY's conduct of the audit, plaintiffs alleged gross
negligence, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation.1 08
The lower California courts applied the foreseeability standard in ac-
cordance with a precedent set by a California appellate court in Interna-
tional Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Accountancy Corp.10 9 This case had
established a foreseeability standard for the scope of auditor duty to third
parties." 0 At trial, the jury had absolved AY of the charges of intentional
fraud and negligent misrepresentation. But it found professional negli-
gence on the part of AY, with no comparative negligence on the part of
the plaintiffs. It awarded damages to plaintiffs equal to about seventy-
five percent of their lost investment."'
The California Supreme Court's majority opinion rejected the foresee-
ability scope of liability applied by the lower courts. Like the opinion in
106. See id. at 747-48.
107. See id. at 748.
108. See id. at 748-49.
109. 223 Cal. Rptr. 218 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
110. See Bily, 834 P.2d at 757.
111. See id. at 749.
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Ultramares, the court expressed concern that a negligence regime would
result in potentially crushing liability to the independent auditing profes-
sion.112 The opinion stated that "[i]n our judgment, a foreseeability rule
applied in this context inevitably produces large numbers of expensive
and complex lawsuits of questionable merit as scores of investors and
lenders seek to recoup business losses.""13 The court also noted that only
a comparatively few jurisdictions had adopted a foreseeability standard of
liability for auditors. 114 The Bily court determined that the allocative effi-
ciency and deterrence criteria discussed in Rosenblum are adequately ad-
dressed by the Restatement's more limited scope of liability."
5
In adopting the Restatement rule, the court interpreted it as indicating
that "an auditor's liability for general negligence in the conduct of an
audit of its client's financial statements is confined to the client, i.e., the
person who contracts for or engages the audit services. Other persons
may not recover on a pure negligence theory. 1" 6 The court explained
that third-party users of financial statements could only bring an action
based on either negligent misrepresentation or fraud." 7
The court distinguished between negligent misrepresentation and ordi-
nary negligence. The distinction has nothing to do with whether there are
material misstatements in the financial statements. Instead, the distinc-
tion made by the California Supreme Court in Bily concerns the relation-
ship of the tortfeasor to the plaintiff. While negligence would involve a
plaintiff whose reliance was reasonably foreseeable, the tort of negligent
misrepresentation requires a more formal relationship between tortfeasor
and plaintiff, such that the plaintiffs reliance on the audit report was sub-
stantially certain. The court suggested a jury instruction for the tort of
negligent misrepresentation as follows:
The representation must have been made with the intent to induce
plaintiff, or a particular class of persons to which plaintiff belongs, to
act in reliance upon the representation in a specific transaction, or a
specific type of transaction, that defendant intended to influence.
Defendant is deemed to have intended to influence [its client's]
transaction with plaintiff whenever defendant knows with substantial
certainty that plaintiff, or the particular class of persons to which
plaintiff belongs, will rely on the representation in the course of the
transaction. If others become aware of the representation and act
upon it, there is no liability even though defendant should reason-
ably have foreseen such a possibility." 8
This narrow-scope interpretation of the Restatement (Second) ap-
proach limits the scope of liability to specific parties whose reliance was
112. See id. at 761.
113. Id. at 767.
114. See id. at 757. The only states that have explicitly adopted the foreseeability stan-
dard are Mississippi, New Jersey, and Wisconsin. See SPELLMIRE, supra note 2, § 2.04.
115. See Bily, 834 P.2d at 758-59.
116. Id. at 767.
117. See id. at 767, 773.
118. Id. at 772-73 (emphasis added).
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actually foreseen, rather than simply parties for whom such reliance is
reasonably foreseeable, and is simply another example of a court arbitrar-
ily choosing a limitation on auditor liability to third parties with no sound
theoretical basis for its choice." 9
E. FRAUD AND CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD BY AUDITORS:
CONSISTENT LIABILITY
The Restatement and privity standards of auditor liability offer consid-
erable protection to the auditor for negligence. But even in jurisdictions
where courts have consistently allowed the protection offered by these
standards, courts have found auditors liable for damages when they com-
mitted fraud or constructive fraud. Constructive fraud exists where the
auditor's breach of care is sufficiently egregious as to support an infer-
ence of fraud.
There is a line of cases that has consistently supported recovery on the
basis of actual and constructive fraud. In State Street Trust Co. v. Ernst &
Ernst,120 decided seven years after the Ultramares decision, the New York
Court of Appeals remanded the case for trial on the basis of constructive
fraud by an audit firm.
In State Street Trust, the Pelz-Greenstein Co. ("Pelz-Greenstein")
sought a working capital loan and line of credit from the plaintiff, State
Street Trust Co. The plaintiffs refused to complete the transaction until
Pelz-Greenstein submitted an audited balance sheet, although they did
extend a limited demand note based on the unaudited financial state-
ments. Pelz-Greenstein engaged the audit firm of Ernst & Ernst
("Ernst"), which was aware that the purpose of the audit report was to
enable Pelz-Greenstein to obtain credit. Ernst issued an unqualified au-
dit opinion to Pelz-Greenstein's balance sheet, which indicated that the
company had substantial net worth. Ernst submitted ten bound copies of
the report directly to Pelz-Greenstein's management. Pelz-Greenstein in
turn submitted the audit report to the plaintiffs, who then agreed to com-
plete the loan transaction. a2a
Approximately seventeen days after Ernst issued the unqualified audit
report to Pelz-Greenstein, Pelz-Greenstein filed for bankruptcy. About
thirty days following the issuance of the audit report, Ernst sent Pelz-
Greenstein a letter explaining that a material amount of the accounts re-
ceivables that were shown as fully collectible were, in fact, likely uncol-
lectable. The letter further explained that Pelz-Greenstein had failed to
record substantial allowances for these uncollectable accounts. These
119. Other courts have seized upon the "particular transaction" language in Bily to
erect the same artificial limits on auditor liability. For example in Machata v. Seidman &
Seidman, 644 So. 2d 114, 116 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994), the court held that the defendant
accounting firm was not liable to the plaintiffs, who had relied upon the firm's audit report
when the plaintiffs participated in certain stock transactions, because the audit firm did not
know that the plaintiffs would be relying on the audit report for that specific transaction.
120. 15 N.E.2d 416 (N.Y. 1938).
121. See id. at 418.
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reserves had the effect of showing that Pelz-Greenstein, contrary to the
original audited financial statements, had a negative net worth, and was
in fact insolvent. Despite the fact that Ernst had originally issued the au-
dit report without qualification, the letter stated that "[t]his balance sheet
is subject to the comments contained in the letter attached to and made a
part of this report."'1 22
The court concluded that deliberately circulating an audit report that
the audit firm itself knew to be misleading "was itself gross negligence
and an important piece of evidence raising an inference of fraud."'1 23 The
court refused to apply the privity rule (as the lower courts had done) and
remanded for trial based on constructive fraud.
Thus the fraud exception to the normal rule of auditor liability has
been consistently upheld, even in jurisdictions that otherwise hold that
auditors owe no duty of care to third parties.
IV. A PROPER SCOPE OF LEGAL DUTY TO THIRD PARTIES
Auditors should be liable to all parties who actually relied upon the
financial statements, regardless of whether they are trade creditors, bank
creditors, debt security investors, or equity investors, and certainly re-
gardless of whether the auditor had actually spoken with that particular
investor. None of the justifications given by the courts or commentators
for limiting liability have any sound theoretical basis.
A. THE ROLE OF THE AUDITOR: CONTRACT VERSUS TORT
As noted earlier in this Comment, and as illustrated by Ultramares and
Credit Alliance, if contract law governs auditor liability, this is usually
dispositive as to the outcome of the typical third-party claim against an
audit firm. Therefore, the first step in determining the proper scope of
legal duty is to determine whether liability should sound in contract law
or tort. This question in turn should be driven by our concept of the role
of the auditor in the modern economy.
Commentators have criticized the privity standard as providing special
treatment to the auditing profession relative to other professionals, who
are said to be subject to an ordinary negligence standard. 24 The issue is
not whether auditors should be liable for negligent audits, but rather the
scope of persons to whom the auditor owes the legal duty of professional
care. Addressing this critical distinction within the context of the com-
mon law, Professor Thomas Grossman claims that no commentator has
cited a single case in which a professional other than an auditor has been
held to owe a duty of care in cases involving negligent misrepresentation
and financial loss rather than physical harm to any party not meeting the
122. Id. at 420.
123. Id.
124. See John W. Bagby & John C. Ruhnka, The Controversy Over Third Party Rights:
Toward More Predictable Parameters of Auditor Liability, 22 GA. L. REV. 149, 180 (1987).
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contract law requirements of privity.' 25 Accordingly, the question is not
whether auditors require special protection. Properly stated, the issue is
whether auditors, because of their unique public role, should be subject
to a broader scope of liability for their negligent professional conduct
than other professionals, outside the restricted privity scope of contract
law.
B. POLICY OBJECTIONS TO BROAD-SCOPE AUDITOR LIABILITY
The fact that most jurisdictions have been reluctant to adopt a foresee-
ability standard, and instead have opted for the intermediate approach
taken by the authors of the Restatement (Second), reflects a perceived
need to place limits upon auditor liability. This approach says that if lia-
bility is to sound in tort, the scope of this liability should be governed
and, if appropriate, limited by public policy considerations. 126 Courts
have expressed various objections to broad-scope auditor liability. The
most persistent objection is the fear of crushing liability to the public ac-
counting profession. Courts have argued that broad scope liability would
result in excessive costs to audit firms because: (a) the primary purpose of
auditing is to benefit the client, with third parties as secondary benefi-
ciaries;127 (b) auditing is primarily dependent upon client-controlled
records and is, therefore, always subject to audit risk;128 and (c) there is a
potentially unlimited pool of potential plaintiffs, for indefinite duration,
since the client, rather than the auditor, controls the distribution of the
audit report.129 These objections are without merit and based upon a mis-
understanding of the audit's function and the planning of an audit.
1. The Primary Purpose of an Audit is to Aid Investors and Creditors
The Ultramares court justified its choice of contract law as the frame-
work for auditor liability based upon its belief that the service performed
by the auditor was primarily for the benefit of the client.130 Originally
the auditing function was primarily used by companies as a check upon,
and supplement to, their internal accounting functions in order to assure
management that it had accurate financial information to enable it to run
the business. Seen in this context, it would be logical that contract law
should govern an arrangement that is best understood as a promise by the
auditor to validate the work of the client's accounting function. Consis-
tent with the Credit Alliance decision, exceptions would be limited to
third parties who are in "near-privity" with the audit firm.
But in the present day, the notion that an audit is primarily for the
benefit of management is hopelessly outdated. Audited financial state-
125. See Grossman, supra note 78, at 228.
126. See Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 335 N.W.2d 361,386 (Wis. 1983).
127. See, e.g., Bily, 834 P.2d at 761 (describing the "watchdog" role of the auditor as
secondary).
128. See id. at 762.
129. See, e.g., Raritan River Steel Co., 367 S.E.2d at 615-16.
130. See Ultramares, 174 N.E. at 446.
[Vol. 53
WATCHING THE WATCHDOG
ments are the lifeblood of our modem economy. As commercial transac-
tions and activities become more complex, audited financial statements
become even more important. Investors, creditors, and shareholders rely
on audited financial statements to become educated about a company
and make well-informed decisions. Suppliers and vendors rely on audited
financial statements to make certain they will get paid for their goods and
services. Banks rely on audited financial statements to make lending de-
cisions. Businesses large and small absolutely need to rely on audited
financial statements. This necessary reliance is what gives the auditor a
"public watchdog" function.
The accounting profession itself has long acknowledged the public duty
performed by the auditor and the profession's unique requirement of in-
dependence from the client. The literature of the profession is unequivo-
cal on this point. 131 The United States Supreme Court has also
recognized the auditing profession's public role. 132
Today, even relatively small firms have sophisticated in-house account-
ing functions that can reliably produce financial statements that are more
or less in accordance with GAAP, and are quite adequate to supply man-
agement with the financial information it needs to make internal deci-
sions. Nevertheless, in order to induce creditors to lend or investors to
invest, management must be prepared to present audited financial state-
ments to these third parties because third parties insist upon having the
additional surety provided by the independent accountant's opinion.
Audited financial statements reduce transaction costs by giving the in-
vestors some assurance that the information on which they are relying is
accurate. It would be extremely costly for investors to spend the time
and resources to assure themselves that the actual financial condition of
the companies in which they invest are in accordance to the assertions
made by the companies' management in the companies' financial state-
ments. Therefore, in situations involving auditor negligence, it is these
third parties, rather than the client, who suffer harm. The auditing pro-
fession primarily exists not to help management verify its numbers, but
rather to provide assurance to creditors and investors.
When evaluated in the context of modern commercial realities, the Ul-
tramares contract-law framework for auditor liability lacks a sound doc-
trinal basis. Nevertheless, the privity doctrine is very much alive and
kicking in nine states, including New York. 133 Additionally, other states,
such as California, have made a narrow interpretation of the Restatement
that approaches a privity standard, in that it excludes most foreseeable
third parties from recovering damages against a negligent auditor. 34 But
131. See Rosenblum, 461 A.2d at 150.
132. See Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. at 817-18.
133. See Bily, 834 P.2d at 752-55. The states that still follow the privity approach are
Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Indiana, Montana, Nebraska, New York, Pennsylvania, and
Virginia. See SPELLMIRE, supra note 2, § 2.04.
134. See generally Bily, 834 P.2d at 752-55.
20001
SMU LAW REVIEW
the movement of most jurisdictions away from contract law reflects the
acknowledgment by courts of the auditor's unique public role.
2. Addressing Audit Risk is the Auditor's Professional Duty
Audit risk is the risk that the financial statements will contain material
misstatements. Every audit has a certain degree of audit risk. There is
inherent risk in any accounting data because of the complexity of the
transactions and the accounting estimates that are made in certain types
of transactions. There is also the risk that the client's accounting system
and controls did not record the transactions properly. The auditor's eval-
uation of management, the proficiency and integrity of the accounting
function of the company, and the inherent risk in recording the types of
transaction in which the company engages all guide the auditor with re-
spect to how rigorous the audit must be (reducing detection risk) in order
to meet the requirements of due care. Courts have reasoned that audit
risk creates an inherently lesser degree of quality control in an auditor's
work product relative to manufacturing. These courts reason that this
risk in an auditor's work product justifies a narrower scope of liability to
third parties. 135 This justification for limiting the scope of auditor negli-
gence is misguided. The courts that have used this justification failed to
see that assessing inherent risk and control risk, and thus adjusting the
audit procedures performed, is simply part of an auditor's professional
duty. Auditors are trained to analyze these types of risks. This ability to
identify areas for potential misstatements is a basic skill of a professional
auditor. Furthermore, this type of analysis may be appropriate in deter-
mining the standard of care, but not in determining to whom the auditor
owes a professional duty.
3. There is a Limited Number of Plaintiffs for a Limited Duration
The courts that have limited auditor liability to so-called foreseeable
users have cited the auditors inability to control the distribution of the
audit report as justification for the limitation of liability.136 This concern
was expressed in Ultramares, where the opinion worried about the "inde-
terminate" number of users,137 and was echoed sixty-one years later in
the California Supreme Court's Bily opinion, where the court character-
ized the potential liability under a foreseeability regime as "'endless be-
cause [it], like light, travels indefinitely in a vacuum. . . . Although
[foreseeability] may set tolerable limits for most types of physical harm, it
provides virtually no limit on liability for nonphysical harm."" 138
The Bily court's reasoning is flawed for two reasons. First, there is not
an unlimited number of plaintiffs in such cases. Plaintiffs must have in-
vested in the company that issued the materially misstated financial state-
135. See id. at 765-66.
136. See Raritan River Steel Co., 367 S.E.2d at 615-16.
137. See Ultramares, 174 N.E. at 444.
138. Bily, 834 P.2d at 762.
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ments. This is clearly a limited class. Second, the notion that audits
persist indefinitely simply ignores the realities of the financial reporting
process. Financial statements become stale within a year and are not a
basis for reliance beyond that point. Addressing this issue, the dissenting
opinion in Bily correctly recognized that "because audited financial state-
ments become obsolete within a few years at most, the accountant's liabil-
ity exposure has been finite and reasonably predictable in duration.
Liability continues only so long as the audited financial statements rea-
sonably influence business decisions."1 39
C. ECONOMIC RATIONALES FOR AND AGAINST BROAD-SCOPE
AUDITOR LIABILITY
1. Cost Spreading
Courts' 40 and commentators 141 have argued inconclusively about
whether economic factors involving the ability to spread or insure against
the cost of auditor malpractice supports a broad or narrow scope of liabil-
ity. The courts' justifications, one way or the other, tend to be bald asser-
tions regarding which party the court thinks can best absorb and spread
these costs, without any rigorous analysis as to why. Professor Siliciano
describes the courts' justifications regarding these economic determinants
as "little more than ritualistic incantations of the concepts of deterrence
and loss bearing, with little or no substance to their application."'1 42
The majority opinion in Bily when addressing this issue once again
demonstrated its lack of understanding of the basic issues before the
court. It reasoned that third-party lenders and investors are frequently
sophisticated market participants with diversified portfolios and are in a
superior position to absorb and spread the costs of a firm's collapse in the
wake of audit failure.'43 Clearly audit firms are not liable to a client's
investors for a client's business failure. That is not the issue. Institutional
investors are in a good position to spread the cost of a company's collapse
by diversifying their portfolios and assessing the business and financial
risk of their investments. Auditors, on the other hand, are in a better
position to absorb and spread the cost of audit failures.
Auditors should be liable for the losses that investors suffer when the
auditor renders an unqualified opinion on financial statements that mate-
rially misrepresent a client's financial position, and the investors rely on
139. Id. at 780.
140. See Rosenblum, 461 A.2d at 152-53 (concluding that the auditing profession can
best prevent and spread the cost of malpractice). But see Bily, 834 P.2d at 765-66 (conclud-
ing that third parties can best prevent and spread the cost of materially misstated financial
statements).
141. See Bagby & Ruhnka, supra note 124, at 185-87 (arguing in favor of broad scope of
liability based on the auditing profession's ability to absorb, spread, and insure against the
costs of malpractice). But see John A. Siliciano, Negligent Accounting and the Limits of
Instrumental Tort Reform, 86 MICH. L. REv. 1929, 1970-78 (1988) (questioning whether
cost spreading is a sound rationale for imposing liability on the auditing profession).
142. Siliciano, supra note 141, at 1978.
143. See Bily, 834 P.2d at 766.
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those financial statements in making their analysis of the business and
financial risk of their investment. Audit firms may absorb and spread the
costs of audit failure by purchasing professional liability insurance. The
auditors, in turn, may pass this cost along to their clients through higher
fees. The higher fees to the clients lower the profits of the clients, thus
passing these costs on to the client's investors - the primary beneficiary of
the audit.
The traditional cost absorption analysis falls short in that the commen-
tators have failed to recognize that in an effort to reduce their audit fees,
the clients will increase their own internal control procedures to reduce
the amount of substantive testing the auditors must do to become com-
fortable with the numbers on the financial statements. When auditors are
held liable for their negligence, they are less likely to succumb to pressure
by a client to reduce fees unless the client increases his own internal con-
trol procedures. Thus auditor liability pressures both the audit firms and
their clients to reduce the number of material errors in financial
statements.
For example, assume the auditor assesses the client's internal controls
as weak, and therefore determines that control risk is 80% - there is an
80% chance that the client's internal controls will miss a material mis-
statement.144 Furthermore, assume that the inherent risk is set at 100%,
and the auditor wants to set audit risk at 10%. The auditor must set de-
tection risk at 12.5%. This number can be derived by the following
formula:
DR= AR = 10% 12.5%
IR xCR 100% x 80%
When the detection risk the auditor must achieve to render an unquali-
fied opinion in accordance with the auditor's professional standards is
12.5%, the auditor must complete enough substantive tests of the client's
accounting transactions to ensure that there is only a 12.5% chance that
the auditor will miss a material error in recording a particular transaction.
This low level of detection risk is necessary to ensure that there is not a
material error in the financial statements. To achieve such a low detec-
tion risk, the auditor must perform a substantial amount of substantive
audit work, thus driving up the time and expense of the audit. In order to
achieve lower audit fees, the company will take steps to improve its inter-
nal accounting controls and thus reduce the control risk assessed by the
auditor. If the client can reduce the control risk assessment to 20%, the
144. The second standard of audit field work requires the auditor to obtain a sufficient
understanding of a client's control structure to plan the audit and determine the nature,
timing, and extent of tests to be performed. See AICPA Auditing Standards, supra note 1,
AU § 319.16. This usually entails flowcharting the client's accounting system identifying all
control points built into the system. Next, the auditor will test a sample of transactions to
see whether those procedures were performed while recording those transactions. If the
control procedures are inadequate or were not consistently applied, the auditor will in-
crease its control risk assessment.
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detection risk will rise to 50%.145 Such a change in the required detection
risk could have a substantial impact on the cost of the audit.
Unless auditors are forced to bear the full costs of performing negligent
audits, they will not be deterred from committing a socially undesirable
level of negligence, nor will their clients set the proper level of internal
controls within their financial reporting function. The statements by
some courts146 that third parties should absorb and spread the risk of
financial reporting error ignores the problem of motivating auditors to
minimize their negligence to a socially desirable level.
2. Best Precaution Taker
Some courts have stated that third parties should be viewed as the best
precaution-takers against financial reporting errors or fraud. For exam-
ple, the California Supreme Court, in its majority opinion in Bily, stated
that third parties are usually sophisticated lenders and investors who are
well suited to evaluate the risk involved in a given transaction or alterna-
tively to mitigate the risks of audit failure through diversification.147
The financial risk of a given transaction and the risk that the investor is
relying on materially misstated financial statements are two totally sepa-
rate issues. Investors cannot independently verify that the financial state-
ments are not materially misstated. If they did not have the assurance
that the numbers on the financial statements were accurate, the risk in all
transactions would increase substantially. The required rate of return for
any given investment would increase significantly, thus squeezing out
many deals that would otherwise be done in an environment where the
numbers on the financial statements can be relied upon. Once again, the
Bily court's analysis is dead wrong.
3. Liability to Third Parties Will Not Result in Fewer Audits
Some commentators argue that auditors may avoid certain types of
firms such as start-ups or firms in new industries, which carry a high de-
gree of audit risk, even where audits might be the most efficient way to
control a portion of the risk of transacting with such firms.148 Even if
audit firms carry malpractice insurance, they may seek to lower their
costs of insurance by avoiding risky clients. 149 These commentators con-
tend that if the costs of audits become too high, due to audit firms having
to pass the costs of excessive auditor liability in the form of higher audit
fees to new or risky clients, some companies that do not absolutely re-
145. 10% = 50%
100% x 20%
146. See e.g., Bily, 834 P.2d at 766.
147. See id.
148. See Kraakman, supra note 31, at 76.
149. See Siliciano, supra note 141, at 1959-60; see also Robert Mednick and Jeffrey J.
Peck, Proportionality: A Much-Needed Solution to the Accountants' Legal Liability Crisis,
28 VAL. U. L. Rv. 867 (1994).
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quire audits in order to function may simply try to operate without audit
opinions, paying a commensurately higher price for higher-risk capital. 150
This extra cost of capital would also be a hidden cost of excessive auditor
liability, since it would be more efficient for these firms to control this
excess risk by means of an audit.
On the most basic level, these arguments are totally unconvincing. Au-
ditors do not assure investors that these new ventures will not fail. They
assure investors that the financial statements of these new ventures are
not materially misstated. These arguments also overlook that fact that
imposing liability on the auditors does not increase the cost of ensuring
that financial statements are accurate. Instead, it is merely a way to allo-
cate these costs.
The audit procedures that the auditors perform during an audit of a
new venture will be based upon the risk of material misstatement that the
auditor assesses during the planning phase of the audit - not the risk that
the venture will fail. One way for new ventures to reduce the costs of
their audits is to take steps to reduce the risk that their financial state-
ments are materially misstated - reduce control risk. These steps may
include investing early on to develop a reliable financial reporting system,
placing proper internal controls in the accounting system, and hiring ex-
perienced and competent financial officers and accounting personnel.
E. PROPORTIONATE LIABILITY
The law should recognize that a negligent audit report may be only one
of numerous substantial factors that results in a third party's decision to
transact with the auditor's client. The auditor should not be liable for the
total amount of losses caused by a third party's decision to transact, but
only for that portion resulting from reliance on a negligent audit re-
port.151 This apportionment should be a matter to be determined by the
trier of fact.
Accordingly, tort doctrine dictates that the auditor should only be lia-
ble for the portion of a third party's loss that was caused by reasonable
reliance on the negligent audit report.152 Courts must recognize that in
many cases of audit failure, factors besides a negligent audit report in-
duced third parties to transact with a risky firm. The California Supreme
Court's majority opinion in Bily made this point by the reference to the
hype that had surrounded the Osborne Computer venture:
150. See Siliciano, supra note 141, at 1970-71.
151. See generally, Mednick & Peck, supra note 149; see also Jordan H. Leibman and
Anne S. Kelly, Accountants' Liability to Third Parties for Negligent Misrepresentation: The
Search for a New Limiting Principle, 30 AM. Bus. L.J. 345, 438 (1992) (concluding that
"[i]n third-party claims against negligent auditors, the reasonably foreseeable plaintiff
should have standing to sue, but the culpability of the auditor should be assessed by the
fact finder and only that equitably apportioned share should be imposed on the auditor,
whether or not potential joint defendants are insolvent or immune from suit").
152. See, e.g., Rosenblum, 461 A.2d at 152.
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Although plaintiffs now profess reliance on Arthur Young's audit re-
port as the sine qua non of their investments, the record reveals a
more complicated decision-making process. As a group of corporate
insiders and venture capitalists who were closely following the Cin-
derella-like transformation of the company, plaintiffs perceived an
opportunity to make a large sum of money in a very short time by
investing in a company that they believed would (literally within
months) become the dominant force in the new personal computer
market.
Although hindsight suggests they misjudged a number of major fac-
tors (including, at a minimum, the product, the market, the competi-
tion, and the company's manufacturing capacity), plaintiffs'
litigation-focused attention is now exclusively on the auditor and its
report. Plaintiffs would have us believe that, had the Arthur Young
report disclosed deficiencies in accounting controls and the [losses],
they would have ignored all the other positive factors that triggered
their interest .... 153
The above excerpt makes the point that the law should not view third-
party reliance upon an audit report, in terms of causation, to be the com-
plete cause of a third party's misfortune in the wake of a firm's collapse in
situations involving audit failure. Third parties base their decisions to
transact upon many factors in addition to an audit report.
Proportionate liability addresses several other arguments against a
broad scope of liability to third parties. Courts and legal commentators
fear that a broad scope of liability will lead to excess litigation because
the auditing profession is a natural "deep pocket" target for disappointed
creditors and investors in the wake of a firm's collapse. But a strict stan-
dard of causation, governed by proportionate liability, would have the
effect of discouraging meritless suits.
V. CONCLUSION
The controversy regarding the scope of common law liability of audi-
tors to third-party users of financial statements continues. Courts have
continually erected artificial limits on auditor liability based upon a gen-
eral misunderstanding of the nature and purpose of audits. As a conse-
quence, in the absence of the discipline of the tort system, the level of
negligence is probably excessive, and the victims are being
undercompensated.
Courts have failed to recognize that auditors are the most efficient con-
trollers of risk within the limits of a GAAS audit and that a professional
negligence standard of liability is necessary to prevent auditors from ex-
ternalizing the costs of their negligence upon third parties. By allowing
auditors to evade liability by means of the outmoded privity doctrine or
restrictive interpretations of the Restatement (Second) standard, courts
have ignored the critical public role played by the auditing profession in
153. Bily, 834 P.2d at 763-64.
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our market economy and the need to deter auditor negligence and to
compensate its victims. The courts have largely based their objections to
broad-based liability on analytically invalid concerns, such as fears of in-
determinate liability, perceived difficulties in determining due care, or ap-
portioning causation.
The privity standard and the stricter interpretations of the Restatement
approach (e.g., as in Bily) fail to either adequately deter negligent con-
duct or compensate the victims of such conduct. When an auditor has
performed an audit in a negligent manner and third parties have
foreseeably relied upon the auditor's professional opinion and suffered
harm, notions of fairness, economic efficiency, and deterrence indicate
that the negligent auditor should share the liability. When an auditor in-
stead escapes all responsibility due to an artificial, and analytically un-
sound, limitation upon the scope of liability the tort system has not
protected private rights from negligence. For this reason, this controversy
will not disappear until the law recognizes that the auditing profession
owes the public a legal duty of care within the limits of the assurance that
it provides in its audit opinions.
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